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The Role of Concordats in the
New Governance of Britain:
Taking Subsidiarity Seriously?1
Andrew Scott*
Devolution has changed fundamentally the system of governance within the UK
The devolution of legislative and administrative competencies over a wide range of
policies to Scotland and Wales necessitated the introduction of arrangements for
policy co-operation and co-ordination involving UK Government and the devolved
administrations. These arrangements are set out in concordats. This article considers
why the concordats were necessary, and analyses their role as devicesfor maintaining
coherence in, and legitinuicy of, UK governance in the face of the challenges raised
by devolution. It then extends the analysis of concordats to an examination of the
role that sub-national authorities generally might play in multi-level governance
systems. It does so by concentrating on the subsidiarity debate in EU governance,
and considers whether this concept can be applied to inform the structure ofpolicy
assignment in that multi-level governance system. The lessons gleanedfrom a study
of UK devolution suggest that subsidiarity, while a potentially useful framework for
assigning powers between national and supranational levels within a trans-national
governance system, has little relevance when applied to the role of sub-national
governance in trans-national systems.
A. INTRODUCTION
Concordats have emerged as a device for co-ordinating UK governance in the wake
of devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. They are agreements
between UK Government and the devolved administrations which are intended to
ensure the coherent governance of the UK notwithstanding the devolution of
* Jean Monnet Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Edinburgh
1 This article draws on research being conducted within an Economic and Social Research Council
supported project on "Devolution and European Policy-Making in Britain" (ESRC award no
L327253024). The author thanks his co-researchers—Caitriona Carter, Simon Buhner, Patricia
Hogwood and Martin Burch—for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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legislative powers to the Scottish Parliament and administrative autonomy to the
National Assembly for Wales. Concordats stipulate the procedures and rules to be
followed by the UK Government and devolved administrations for effecting co-
operation and co-ordination in policy processes characterised by shared competence
(i.e. concurrent powers), or with respect to policies where the actions of one
administration will impact on the policy environment of the other administration.
Why concordats are necessary is implicit in a comment made by Vernon Bogdanor:
Devolution is the most radical constitutional reform this country has seen since the
Great Reform Act of 1832. This is because it seeks to reconcile two seemingly con-
flicting principles, the sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament and the grant of self
government in domestic affairs to Scotland and Wales.2
The role of concordats is to achieve precisely the reconciliation that Bogdanor
identifies. It is in this context that we must appraise concordats, a context in which
the political—and by implication the constitutional—significance of concordats is
starkly revealed. Against this background, it is therefore unsurprising that the
publication of concordats itself became a political event. That the concordats were
presented as an already agreed series of documents was greeted with substantial
protest from the nationalist lobby within the Scottish Parliament and, to a lesser
extent, the Welsh Assembly.3 Leaving to one side for the moment the validity of the
criticisms levelled against concordats, the debate itself was constitutive in defining
the central political and constitutional significance that the concordats would have
in the future governance of the UK.
In this article we review the concordats both from a procedural and an analytical
perspective—what role they are intended to play, and how we might appraise the
concordats in that context. We offer two perspectives on this question. First, we
critique the concordats on the terms on which they are presented—namely, as
instruments of "good governance" necessitated by the particularities of the devolution
settlement. We find there is much persuasiveness in that argument although, as we
demonstrate, establishing the administrative need for concordats cannot in itself
validate or refute the criticisms that have been made against them. In the main, the
focus of this paper is devolution under the Scottish model. Unlike the situation under
the Government ofWales Act, devolution to Scotland transferred legislative authority
to the Scottish Parliament with the result that the fault lines in the resultant UK
governance system became very clear. As the role of the concordats is to stabilise
these fault lines, it is in the Scottish model of devolution that a critique of concordats
2 V Bogdanor, "Constitutional Reform in the UK". Paper presented at the Centre for Public Law,
University of Cambridge, January 1998.
3 For example, the Liberal Democrat leader in the Welsh Assembly observed that: "the tone of the
document [concordat] could sometimes be seen as treating us as country cousins". Cited in J Osmond,
Devolution: "A Dynamic, Settled Process" (1999) at 30.
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reveals the full extent of the underlying issues. Second, we consider the concordats
as instruments of multi-level governance within the context of the EU. To what
extent is devolution within the UK consonant with the trend towards enhanced intra-
EU "regionalism", and does the analysis of concordats cast any light on how the EU
governance system might be arranged to deal with an essentially similar set of
problems—that is, the reconciliation between administrative efficiency on the one
hand and political or constitutional legitimacy on the other? As we discuss, the debate
within the UK with respect to the domestic policy content and context ofEU policies
is one that is mirrored elsewhere in the EU. Moreover, it is a debate that is likely
to become more intense as global "management" of hitherto national (and sub-
national) economic and social policies becomes more formalised and, as a result,
more invasive.
The remainder of the article is arranged as follows. In section B we present a
narrative which documents the history and the content of the concordats, and
describes the function they perform in the organisation of UK governance in the
aftermath of devolution to Scotland and Wales. In section C we offer a critique
of the concordats as instruments of governance. We apply two criteria in this
critique—legitimacy and accountability. In section D we extend our analysis of UK
devolution to the EU arena and review the lessons that devolution has for the
evolution of intra-EU regionalism, or multi-level governance. We offer our
conclusions in section E.
B. THE CONCORDATS
(1) The need for concordats
Devolution formed the centrepiece of the 1997 Labour Government's package of
measures aimed at modernising the British constitution.4 Following the territorial
elections held in May 1999, the newly created Scottish Parliament and Welsh
Assembly convened in July, and by so doing changed fundamentally the governance
system of the UK. Devolution served to shift the locus of British political and
administrative power away from the Westminster-Whitehall nexus. Henceforth, the
territorial capitals in Scotland and Wales would command considerable direct and
indirect influence over the devolved economic and social policies and, albeit to a
lesser degree, the policies for which competence is reserved to the UK Government.
A distinctive feature of the devolution settlement is its asymmetric nature with
respect to the powers granted to the administrations in Scotland and Wales. The
Scotland Act 1998 provided for the establishment of the Scottish Executive and a
4 Other elements were freedom of information legislation, reform of the House of Lords, electoral
reform, and initiatives designed to modernise Government and Parliament.
24 THE EDINBURGH LAW REVIEW Vol 5 2001
directly elected legislature—the Scottish Parliament—with competence to pass
primary legislation over all devolved policies. In contrast, the Wales Act did not
provide for a separate Welsh legislature. Instead, the directly elected Welsh Assembly
would have the power to implement and administer those aspects ofUK Government
legislation devolved to it under the transfer of functions order—essentially the same
set ofpolicies as those over which the Scottish Parliament has legislative competence.
The executive powers of the Assembly are delegated to the First Minister who is
elected by the whole Assembly. He in turn delegates administrative responsibility to
a number of Assembly Secretaries who collectively form the Assembly Cabinet.5
Unlike the approach taken to devolution in the 1970s, the current variant identified
policies that will remain the prerogative of UK Government (reserved matters),6
with all policies not so designated being devolved. Notwithstanding this formal assign-
ment, it was recognised from the outset that the interaction between devolved and
reserved policies would necessitate close co-operation and co-ordination between
UK Government and the devolved administrations on virtually all matters. For
instance, both devolution White Papers noted that the devolved administrations
would be closely involved in the UK Government policy process with respect to EU
issues—an example of a reserved matter which impacts significantly on devolved
competencies.' Two avenues of territorial involvement in reserved matters were
identified—through the offices of the territorial Secretaries of State, who retain their
membership of the Cabinet (and, crucially, Cabinet Committees), and via inter-
administration and inter-governmental arrangements to be agreed and codified in
the form of concordats.8 Once devolution had taken effect, the concordats would
play a pivotal role in the new arrangements.
The centrality of the concordats to the new governance system of the UK can
readily be demonstrated by considering the devolution legislation itself. Neither
the Scotland Act nor the Wales Act provided for an institution or a procedure to
facilitate either co-operation or dispute settlement between UK Government and
the devolved administrations, or between the devolved administrations themselves,
with respect to policies of joint interest—be these reserved or devolved. The only
arbitration provision mentioned in the legislation referred to inter-administration
disputes over vires and these would be settled by the Privy Council. Instead, it was
left to putative concordats to prescribe the procedures and arrangements—including
5 The Assembly is a corporate body.
6 Reserved matters are: constitution of the UK; foreign policy (including relations with the EU);
defence and national security; border controls; fiscal and monetary policies (excepting the tax varying
power under the Scotland Act and local taxation); common market for UK goods and services;
employment regulation; social security; regulation of certain professions; transport safety and
regulation; and certain other matters such as Ordnance Survey, broadcasting, etc.
7 See White Papers; Scotland's Parliament (Cm 3658), ch 5 and A Voice for Wales (Cm 3718), ch 3.
8 Concordats are referred to in both White Papers.
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inter-administration dispute settlement—for mediating the relevant policy processes
once devolution took effect.9 Clearly, the concordats would assume considerable
administrative importance. Beyond this, however, they also would play a crucial
political role under the UK devolution model. Under ss 35 and 58 of the Scotland
Act, the Secretary of State is granted a general "power to intervene" to prevent Acts
of the Scottish Parliament entering into force where these may be incompatible with
UK international obligations or legislation on reserved matters. The Lord Chancellor,
Lord Irvine, neatly summarised the resulting constitutional position when he noted:
"Although the Westminster Parliament ultimately retains sovereignty, the Scottish
Parliament and Scottish Executive enjoy a very high level of autonomy."10 Of course,
should the Secretary of State exercise this power to intervene then almost certainly
this would precipitate a political crisis. Consequently, it would fall to the procedures
and arrangements set out in concordats to prevent such a situation from arising.
Therefore, although the concordats are not, by definition, constitutional documents,
it is indisputable that they occupy a pivotal position within the devolution settlement.
As instruments of governance, concordats are designed to tackle two types of
policy externality that arise in many multi-level systems of governance—policy over-
lap and policy contagion.11 Policy overlap occurs when two tiers within a unitary
governance system each have competence over a particular policy—this is commonly
described as the problem of concurrent powers. Devolution has triggered two situa-
tions of potential policy overlap; first, when legislative proposals being considered
by the devolved administration conflict with UK legislation, or legislative proposals,
with respect to reserved matters; second, when legislative proposals being considered
by UK Government conflict with the devolved administration's legislation, or
legislative proposals, with respect to devolved matters. Policy overlap is unavoidable
in the UK devolution model, and represents a potential source of dispute between
UK Government and the devolved administration. The problem is readily demon-
strated with respect to policy on EU matters. Although UK European Union policy
is a reserved matter, devolution transferred legislative competence to the Scottish
Parliament (and the administrative authority to the Welsh Assembly) for a range
of issues that have a significant EU dimension—e.g. agriculture, fisheries, the
9 On 27 July 1998 Baroness Ramsay made a statement in the House of Lords announcing that a
dispute resolution process would be established under the aegis of the Joint Ministerial Committee.
See HL Debs 27 July 1998, col 1488.
10 Speech delivered by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg, entitled "Britain's programme of
constitutional change", University of Leiden, The Netherlands, 22 October 1999 (text available at
http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd/speeches/1999/1999fr.htm) (emphasis added).
11 Typically, policy externalities within multi-level governance (pluralist) systems are resolved according
to clear constitutional rules mediated through transparent political procedures—that is, through
properly constituted federal institutions and processes. Clearly, this does not apply to the reformed
UK governance system.
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environment, transport and regional policies. Policy overlap becomes problematic if
the position adopted by the UK Government with respect to an EU legislative
proposal on a devolved matter diverges from the devolved administration's position
on that issue. For this reason, the devolution White Papers included a commitment
by the UK Government to work with the devolved administrations at each of the
four stages of the UK's European policy process—policy formulation, negotiation,
implementation and enforcement.12 Policy overlap can be managed by two
mechanisms: (a) by restricting the legislative autonomy of the devolved administra-
tions with respect to devolved competencies; (b) by imposing on UK Government
an obligation to consult with the devolved administrations over policy developments
in reserved matters. The concordats represent just such mechanisms, and stipulate
arrangements for co-operation and co-ordination between the UK Government and
the devolved administrations in cases of overlapping competencies. Further, the
concordats specify the procedures that will be triggered if the administrations fail to
agree a consensus position.
The concordats were also intended to resolve the problem of policy contagion.
Policy contagion occurs when the policy adopted (or proposed) by a devolved
administration impacts upon—or threatens to impact upon—the policy choices
confronting another devolved administration, or the national administration. It is a
standard problem of policy assignment in federal-type structures. The asymmetric
nature of the devolution settlement suggests that policy contagion is most likely to
arise between the Scottish and UK administrations. In the devolution debate policy
contagion was first anticipated in the context of territorial competition in the financial
incentives offered to attract inward investment. Both White Papers stated that such
incentives would be subject to ".
.
.
common UK guidelines and consultation
arrangements to be set out in a published concordat".13 In the event, similar concerns
about contagion are evident in a number of the concordats. The concordat between
the Scottish Executive and UK Government on Health and Social Care is a good
example. It states that:
The creation of the
. . .
[devolved administrations]
. . .
allows greater divergence in
policy making to address local needs and priorities. Without close co-operationbetween all four UK administrations there is the risk that developments in one
administration may inadvertently constrain or put pressure on policy orfinances of
the other administrations.1*
12 See Scotland's Parliament, ch 5. The Welsh White Paper included a similar commitment that UK
European policy would incorporate Welsh considerations.
13 See A Voice for Wales, para 2.24 and Scotland's Parliament, para 2.4. The intention was to avoid
competition between administrations for footloose investment from arising. However, some MPs
felt that this provision undermined the Scottish Executive's autonomy over industrial policy—a
devolved competence—and would result in a reduction in the volume of inward investment to
Scotland.
14 Concordat on Health and Social Care, para 1 (emphasis added).
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The apparent contradiction between advocating the devolution of competencies and
simultaneously restricting the degree to which this can be exercised autonomously is
explained insofar as policy differences between discrete legislative or administrative
jurisdictions become a factor determining economic or social decision-making (i.e.
resource allocation and/or movements of factors of produc-tion).15 An added source
of concern to the UK Government was the possibility that policy contagion would
acquire an explicitly political aspect—for example, should a Scottish administration
utilise its policy competencies with the express intention of undermining UK
Government's policy decisions.16
In the light of our discussion thus far, the presentation of concordats as con-
stitutionally neutral devices—necessitated by policy externalities arising from
devolution and essential if a unitary UK governance system was to be maintained—
is persuasive.17 Yet, a different interpretation of concordats has been offered by
their critics.18 When viewed against a backdrop of asymmetric devolution, the
pervasive problem of concurrent powers, and the perceived costs ofpolicy contagion,
concordats have been attacked as arrangements designed to stifle devolution and
instead to buttress the dominance ofcentral government in the context of an apparent
shift to a pluralist (or multi-level) governance system. Before examining this critique,
we devote the remainder of this section to setting out the structure and scope of the
concordats as "administrative" instruments.
(2) The structure of the concordats
Implementing devolution in a policy-efficient manner necessitated that new arrange-
ments were devised to facilitate co-operative and co-ordinated policy-making
between the UK Government and the devolved administrations—i.e. to manage
policy externalities. Prior to devolution, of course, these were managed internally.
The territorial contribution to the UK policy-process was the responsibility of the
Scottish and the Welsh Offices, and their respective Secretaries of State. Officials
from the territorial offices participated in all the relevant official policy-networks
within UK Government, including the all-important Cabinet Committee network
responsible for brokering a consensus policy position where inter-departmental
disputes had arisen. With devolution and the creation of a new governing tier outside
15 In public finance terms it is a standard argument that where the effects of a policy introduced in onejurisdiction spill over to another jurisdiction there is a case for central intervention to promote that
activity if it is beneficial, or restrict it if it is harmful.
16 This would be more likely if the political complexion of the devolved administrations differed from
the UK Government.
17 The concordats may be described as procedures for handling the additional policy transaction costs
that arise with devolution.
18 See the comments by John Swinney, MSP, and Alex Neil, MSP, in the course of the debate over
concordats held in the Scottish Parliament on 7 October 1999.
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of UK Government, the devolved administrations no longer had access to these
official networks and new agreements had to be established to facilitate co-operation
and co-ordinated policy-making between the now separate administrations. As was
noted in the devolution White Paper, Scotland's Parliament:
The Scottish Executive will need to keep in close touch with departments of the UK
Government. Good communication systems will be vital. Departments in both
administrations will develop mutual understandings covering the appropriate
exchange of information, advance notification and joint working. The principles will
be as follows:
• the vast majority ofmatters should be capable ofbeing handled routinely among
officials of the departments in question
• if further discussion is needed on any issue, the Cabinet Office and its Scottish
Executive counterpart will mediate, again at official level
• on some issues there will need to be discussions between the Scottish Executive
and Ministers in the UK Government.19
The concordats elaborated the principles of inter-administration co-operation,
and defined the framework within which co-ordinated policy-making would evolve.
It was implicit from the outset, and stressed on many occasions subsequently, that
concordats would not create legal obligations or restrictions on any signatory.20 They
would be voluntary codes of conduct to guide the day-to-day work of officials in the
respective administrations, and could be re-negotiated in the light of experience.21
Concordats were (to be regarded as) neutral political and constitutional documents,
whose purpose was to effect a seamless transition of the UK policy process from a
system involving one administrative entity to a multi-player system involving a
number of participants. The concordats were based on four guidelines: (a) full
communication and consultation between the administrations on matters of joint
interest, with each administration giving due consideration to the views of the
other; (b) co-operation between administrations in all stages of the development of
policies for which each had competence; (c) a full exchange of information between
the administrations on all relevant policy-related matters—the principle of "no
surprises"; and (d) each administration would respect the confidentiality of
information passed to it by the other, subject to safeguards where necessary.
As befitted their functional nature, the preparation of concordats was left in the
hands of officials during the run-up to devolution and normally would be signed by
senior officials in Whitehall and their counterparts in the territorial administrations.
Ministers would become involved only where the subject-matter was (deemed to
19 Scotland's Parliament, ch 4.13.
20 Were they so to do, they would be elevated to a constitutional status and may be a subject of legal
debate.
21 This was very much in keeping with the UK/Whitehall approach to governance, which prefers codes
and procedures rather than the juridification associated with many forms of constitutionalism.
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be) politically sensitive, or where officials were unable to agree the precise terms of
a particular concordat. The intention was that the concordats would be published
once ready, and the expectation was that this would be prior to the inaugural elections
to the devolved assemblies scheduled for May 1999. In the event, the first concordats
were not published until late in 1999. A number of reasons were given for the delay,
the most convincing of which was simply that the concordats were not ready on
time. However, the implication was that the relevant time frame incorporated a
political window which closed ahead of the election date to avoid the concordats
becoming an election issue.22
The officials charged with drafting the terms of the concordats have acknowledged
that, in large measure, they were "making it up as they went along". There was no
master plan; no pre-existing model; no apparent political agenda. Instead, the
only rule—if it can be called such—was that, wherever possible, prevailing inter-
departmental good practice would be codified in the concordat, thereby becoming
(post-devolution) recommended inter-administration good practice. Continuity
rather than change was sought wherever possible. Therefore, where an adminis-
tration was considering policy developments which would impact on the other
(i.e. where a policy externality arose), co-operation and co-ordination would be
managed principally on an inter-departmental basis much as before—that is, between
the relevant department in Whitehall and its counterpart in the devolved adminis-
trations.23 New arrangements and procedures would be proposed only where
required in the light of the changed constitutional situation. This tended to be the
case where the policy issue did not have an obvious departmental home—for instance
where the matter was relevant to a number of departments within the devolved
administration and cross-departmental co-ordination was required. In such cases,
responsibility tended to fall to the relevant central agency within the administra-
tions.24 The most difficult challenge was to devise arrangements capable of mediat-
ing disputes between the territorial administration(s) and UK Government in
those instances where the inter-departmental procedures (including the good
offices of the territorial Secretary of State) had failed to broker a consensus. This
raised complex questions of procedure and constitutionality. While it was self-
evident that these arrangements could not compromise the ultimate sovereignty of
22 The fact that, in the event, the concordats were not published until late in 1999 does suggest that
they simply were not ready sooner rather than their being caught up in a pre-election purdah. An
added complication during this period was the lack of progress being made with the devolution
settlement in Northern Ireland, which may have contributed to this delay.
23 The pervasive incidence of policy externalities under the UK devolution model always implied that a
large number of concordats would be required.
24 The Cabinet Office fulfilled this role in Whitehall, and the newly established Executive Secretariat
was intended to do so within the Scottish Executive. In Wales this would fall to the relevant com-
mittee within the Assembly.
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the UK Parliament, at the same time straightforward political realism dictated that
they had to be effective in mediating conflict between the parties where disputes
arose.
Because of the asymmetrical nature of the devolution settlement, it became clear
that two types of concordat would be needed—bilateral and quadrilateral.25 Bilateral
concordats would cover inter-administration relations between an individual
Whitehall department and its counterpart in one devolved administration.26 In the
main, these documents codified the intra-administration consultation and co-
ordination good practices which prevailed prior to devolution, and appended new
provisions for resolving inter-administration disputes. Quadrilateral concordats, on
the other hand, were (to be) signed jointly by UK Government and each of the
(three) devolved administrations. Quadrilateral concordats set out the arrangements
for co-operation between the territorial and UK Governments on matters of common
interest that lay outside single departmental responsibility (e.g. statistics), and on
reserved matters on which a territorial, as opposed to a departmental, input was
appropriate, such as international relations and UK European Union policy.27 Later,
two additional considerations shaped the final structure of the concordats. First, as
many of the terms and conditions of inter-administration policy co-operation and
co-ordination (including the provisions for dispute resolution) would have general
applicability to all concordats (bilateral and quadrilateral), it was decided to
incorporate these within an over-arching "super concordat"—the Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU). The conditions stipulated in the MoU would be implicit
to all other concordats or supplementary agreements.28 Second, the asymmetry of
the devolution legislation meant that certain aspects of each of the quadrilateral
concordats were not applicable to both Scotland and Wales. This was catered for by
producing a common quadrilateral concordat flanked by two bilateral concordats
where required.29 The concordats were presented in two tranches. In October 1999
the MoU, incorporating five quadrilateral concordats, was released. This was followed
by the publication, one by one, of the bilateral—departmental and administration
specific—concordats.
The structure of the concordats is fairly straightforward. The MoU is divided
into two parts. The first part defines the "principles that will underlie relations"
25 A range of options for the design of the concordats were considered as the inter-administrative
implications of an asymmetric devolution settlement became clearer.
26 As the name implies, a bilateral concordat involved only two parties—the Whitehall department and
its territorial counterpart in a devolved administration. Most concordats are bilateral simply because
the respective devolution settlements differ so greatly.
27 If a policy was covered both by a bilateral and a quadrilateral concordat (e.g. agricultural) then the
terms of the former had to be consistent with the terms of the latter.
28 That is, any inter-administration procedures agreed subsequently.
29 This was the case in the concordat on International Relations, and the concordat on the EU.
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between UK Government and the devolved administrations.30 As already indicated,
it elaborates the broad principles that will govern inter-administration policy
co-operation and co-ordination, emphasising in particular the need for timely and
comprehensive exchange of information, full consultation over relevant matters, and
confidentiality of deliberations. The first part also asserts the general principle that,
despite their reserved status, the devolved administrations will be involved in UK
international and EU policy-making insofar as these issues affect devolved com-
petencies. Finally, this part provides for the establishment of a Joint Ministerial
Committee (JMC) to be used to resolve inter-administration disputes.31
The second part of the MoU elaborates the arrangements through five quadri-
lateral concordats: (a) agreement on the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC); (b)
concordat on co-ordination of EU issues; (c) concordat on financial assistance to
industry; (d) concordat on international relations; and (e) concordat on statistics. In
each case, the concordat stipulates the obligations that fall on each of the adminis-
trations in jointly contributing to UK policy in these policy issues, and provides
guidance for resolving any disputes that may arise.
The agreement on the JMC is fundamental to the devolution exercise. Its terms
of reference are: (a) to consider non-devolved matters which impinge on devolved
responsibilities, and devolved matters which impinge on non-devolved respon-
sibilities; (b) where the UK Government and the devolved administrations so agree,
to consider devolved matters if it is beneficial to discuss their respective treatment
in the different parts of the UK; (c) to keep the arrangements for liaison between
the UK Government and the devolved administrations under review; and (d) to
consider disputes between the administrations. In addition to dispute resolution,
the JMC will address a range of policy issues that arise from the policy externalities
accompanying devolution, including inter-administration consultation on UK
European policy. None the less, it is likely to be in the discharge of its dispute
resolution function that the JMC will receive the closest scrutiny. In this role, the
JMC will convene—typically in functional format—where an issue (falling within
the ambit of point (a) above) cannot be resolved through bilateral exchanges at
ministerial level, or through the good offices of the territorial Secretary of State. The
JMC machinery can be invoked by UK Government or any of the devolved
administrations.32 Any agreement reached within the JMC procedures will be
30 MoU, part 1, para 1.
31 The JMC was established to settle disputes between the territorial administrations and the UK
Government with respect to policy over reserved matters, and as a forum for co-ordinating policy
between the territorial administrations and UK Government with respect to devolved matters.
It is an advisory body which will include Ministers from the devolved administrations and UK
Government. Generally it will convene in "functional" format, and be chaired by the relevant
UK Minister. Its conclusions are not binding on any party.
32 MoU, point A1.8.
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consultative only, although "the expectation is that participating administrations will
support positions that the JMC had agreed".33 Finally, the proceedings of JMC
meetings will be confidential, although "there may be occasions on which the
Committee will wish to issue a public statement on the outcome of its discussions".34
The MoU is complemented by a series of bilateral concordats signed between the
UK Government and individual devolved administrations. As already indicated,
bilateral concordats typically are agreements between the devolved administrations
and individual Whitehall departments,35 although in some cases are presented as
agreements between the relevant ministers.36 These concordats stipulate the
expectations that each administration has with respect to policy co-operation and
co-ordination in that policy area, with the specific emphasis of each being determined
largely by the type of policy externality that has to be accommodated. In total some
fourteen bilateral concordats have been signed between UK Government and the
Scottish Executive.3'
As we have already noted, concordats are not legally binding contracts. Nor are
they intended to create rights or obligations that are legally enforceable. They are
instead voluntary agreements between administrations which codify common sense
principles of good governance in the context of devolution, including an under-
standable "no surprises" responsibility on both devolved and UK administrations. As
the late Scottish First Minister Donald Dewar quipped, concordats can best be
regarded as "road maps for bureaucrats".38 Presented in that way, concordats appear
to be sensible arrangements for effecting the smooth transition from a singular to a
pluralist (or multi-level) governance system. However, even within these terms, to
be successful the concordats in achieving their aim have to address two problems.
First, concordats have to be interpreted and given effect by those to whom they
are addressed—namely, the officials in the respective administrations. Like all
institutions, UK Government departments embody deep-seated cultures in the form
of conventions, habits and norms which will need to be superseded if the new
33 Ibid, point Al.10.
34 Ibid, point ALU.
35 The Departments were the Department for Culture, Media and Sport; the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food; the Cabinet Office; the Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions; the Department of Trade and Industry; the Home Office; the Lord Chancellor's
Department; the Department of Social Security and the Treasury.
36 This was the case for the concordats covering Defence; Education and Employment; and Health
and Social Care.
37 The ethos of bilateral concordats is neatly captured in the concordat between the Scottish Executive
and the Lord Chancellor's Department. The concordat seeks to ensure that there are "no surprises"
between administrations with regard to any plans either has which might impinge on the
responsibilities of the other.
38 Donald Dewar made this remark during the Scottish Parliament's debate on the concordats held on
7 October 1999.
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arrangements are to work effectively. Second, the concordats have to generate a
confidence within the polity in general that the arrangements they prescribe are
working effectively—that the new arrangement of UK governance does involve a
meaningful dialogue between equal partners and is not instead reproducing
centralised government under a different guise. Otherwise critics may question
the extent to which inter-administration procedures themselves are shaping or
determining policy outcomes rather than the devolved administrations doing so by
exercising the competencies assigned to them.
C. THE CONCORDATS: A CRITIQUE
Although presented by the Scottish Executive as administrative documents, the
concordats became the subject of a heated political debate as soon as they were
published. Critics, principally from within the Scottish National Party, raised two
issues. First, that the provisions of the concordats effectively curtailed the sovereignty
of the devolved administration and its legislature. Second, that the terms of
concordats should have been subject to a debate within, and—crucially—ratification
by, the Scottish Parliament before being adopted.39 Both criticisms were rebutted
vigorously by the Executive. The first criticism was dismissed, properly, as incorrect.
As we noted earlier, the devolution legislation did nothing to weaken the sovereignty
of the UK Parliament. Instead, it delegated to the Scottish Parliament the authority
to legislate in devolved matters.40 Consequently, as the First Minister pointed out,
the provisions of the concordats did not—nor could they—affect the constitutional
situation. The second criticism was dismissed on the basis that the concordats were
agreements between the UK and the devolved administrations over procedures for
policy co-operation and co-ordination. As the Parliament was neither a signatory to
the concordats, nor was its constitutional position affected by the terms of the
concordats, there was no reason for these documents to be subject to Parliamentary
ratification. On the face of it, both answers are persuasive. However, neither has
proved to be entirely convincing.41 We suggest that the critics have raised important
questions which have not, to date, been given adequate consideration—questions
about how concordats should be conceptualised within the broader constitutional
architecture of reformed British governance; the criteria by which certain provisions
of the concordats should be evaluated; and the role of Parliament with respect to
39 These criticisms, and other more detailed points, were levelled by Alex Neil, MSP, on behalf of the
Scottish National Party during the concordats debate.
40 The failure to distinguish between sovereignty and delegated authority is a cause of much confusion
in the debate.
41 Concordats continue to be a subject of controversy, particularly in Scotland.
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these tasks.42 Nothing in our critique is intended to imply that the concordats are
either unnecessary or undesirable. Quite the opposite is the case: given the nature of
devolution, the type of arrangements provided for in the concordats are, as we have
suggested, both necessary and desirable. Instead, we will argue that the essentially
positivist interpretation of concordats offered by the Scottish Executive, and which
is justified by reference to the formal constitutional position, ignores the practical
significance that the concordats will assume in the new arrangements of British
governance. That concordats have no base in constitutional law does not mean they
are without constitutional significance.43 Indeed, we conclude that the terms and
operation of the concordats will be a crucial influence over the stability of the
reformed system of British governance. There are two aspects to our critique. The
first critique takes its cue from considerations of legitimacy, the second from issues
of accountability.
(1) Concordats and legitimacy
A standard reading of the British constitution identifies it as a fluid set ofprocedures
and arrangements which reflect a combination of law and convention, institutional
codes and norms, principles and expediency and which, collectively, define the
prevailing system of governance.44 In that literature, the constitutional significance
of the civil service is a prominent theme.45 The civil service is fundamental to British
governance. It is civil servants who transform political manifestos into effective
Government policies, and who ensure continuity of governance at times of dis-
continuity in government. They are impartial policy advisors to Government, and
are required to broker agreement between the departments of Government where
disagreements over policy matters arise.46 The civil service acts as the collective
memory of the state, and it is civil servants who are responsible for providing the
context for a new Government as it confronts the range ofpolicy portfolios for which
it has assumed responsibility. Civil servants discharge these various functions via a
panoply of internal rules, codes, conventions and norms that are designed to facilitate
the administration of governance as stipulated by the Government of the day, within
constitutional constraints and with minimal interference from extraneous sources.
To borrow a metaphor, the civil service can be characterised as the software of the
operating system that is British governance, without which the operating system will
42 This latter question is crucial if, as provided for in the concordats, the arrangements are to be
revised in the light of experience.
43 For a discussion regarding the role of conventions in constitutional theory, see C R Munro, Studies
in Constitutional Law, 2nd edn (1999) at 55-87.
44 This conceptualisation of the British constitution begins with Bagehot's The English Constitution.
45 See, for example, P Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution (1995) at
119-138.
46 For an excellent overview of the Civil Service, see P Hennessy, Whitehall (1989) ch 16.
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not function.47 We can usefully extend this metaphor to capture the significance of
the administrative arrangements which have been introduced to facilitate the
transition to multi-level governance in the UK. Devolution has changed the internal
configuration of the operating system of British governance; it has changed the
structure of governance from singular to pluralist. Accordingly, the software that
drives the operating system must be upgraded to ensure that the reconfigured system
can execute efficiently the extended range of tasks now required of it, and resolve
unanticipated problems that may arise. The software upgrade must incorporate
routines that disable any viruses spawned within the new environment, which
have the potential to immobilise the system. Indeed, astute software analysts will
build-in an override facility within the new procedures to enable an operator to
reboot the entire system under its original configuration should the new routines
fail. The metaphor is obvious, as is its appeal. The reconfigured operating system
of governance is defined by the devolution legislation. The concordats represent
the software upgrade, and these incorporate various virus guards protecting the
system from attack by policy externalities. The override facility is provided by the
ultimate sovereignty of the UK Parliament which can be applied in the event of a
bug in the software of the new operating system. The metaphor neatly explicates
the argument that concordats are related to functions rather than to outcomes,
and as such are an issue for functionaries and not politicians. At the same time,
however, it captures graphically the significance of concordats as a new and
crucial element in the internal administrative procedures of (reformed) British
governance. The constitutional significance of concordats is laid bare: they are
essential to the new governance arrangements. Should they fail, a constitutional
crisis is likely to follow.
That the concordats will play a key constitutional role is undeniable: indeed,
this is precisely their function. The concordats define the mechanics of inter-
administration policy arrangements, including dispute settlement, the sole purpose
of which is to buttress the new system of UK governance. They do this in three
respects: (a) by modulating the legislative autonomy of the Scottish Parliament,
though not its legislative authority;46 (b) by defining the terms under which the
devolved administrations will participate in the formulation and negotiation of UK
policy with respect to specific reserved matters; and (c) by prescribing the arrange-
ments for resolving disputes between UK Government and the devolved adminis-
47 Hennessy attributes this metaphor to Lord Bancroft, former Head of the Civil Service (The Hidden
Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution at 23). Later in the same volume, at 127, Hennessy
cites Lord Bancroft describing the role of the Civil Service as "to act as a permanent piece of ballast
in the Constitution on the basis that you have what can be a very volatile legislature and an equally
volatile ministerial executive. Sometimes, therefore, you need a degree ofbalance and permanence".
48 If practised for a period of time, constraints on autonomy could result in a loss of authority.
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trations on the above issues, including the openness of these arrangements to public
scrutiny and Parliamentary accountability. Viewed in this context, it is clear that the
concordats are more than simply procedural postscripts to the constitutional
settlement. The concordats stipulate the conditions under which the conditional
delegation of competencies to the devolved administrations and their assemblies
will be exercised. However, that devolution is conditional in this sense is not the
basis of the controversy.
That a Parliament may find its effective (as opposed to constitutional) legislative
autonomy being constrained by force of circumstances is neither uncommon nor
necessarily controversial—this is precisely the consequence of many international
treaties and accords.49 However, imposing limitations on the autonomy ofParliament
which have not been debated and endorsed by that Parliament is a different matter
entirely, and is almost certain to provoke controversy, even where it was implicit
that it would be necessary to impose such limitations. And understandably so, as
these restrictions command neither constitutional authority (in which case theywould
have been subject to debate and ratification) nor political legitimacy. Although
scholars acknowledge that legitimacy is a notoriously vague concept which does not
readily lend itself to rigorous analysis, it appears that concerns precisely of this nature
lie at the heart of the Labour Government's constitutional reform measures. For
instance, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg, has commented:
The worlds democracies face many challenges in common. Public disillusionment
with politics is one of the most critical. From country to country, our circumstances
may differ, but we share a common challenge—the perception by people that
government serves the governors, not the people. It is the duty of those in government
to demonstrate that democratic politics are not just better than the alternatives—but
that they merit respect in their own right.
. .
The United Kingdom has suffered from
a long drift towards ever greater centralisation of political power. This has caused
many to feel that they have little or no opportunity to influence the important decisions
that affect their daily lives. The accountability of government to the people has been
damaged by a culture of secrecy . . . Our solutions are based on the incremental
development of a mature democracy, where government is brought closer to the
people.50
The relevant question is not whether devolution brings government closer to the
people. As a constitutional event clearly it does. But it is straightforward to show that
devolution is not coterminous with legitimacy. While a law enacted by the Scottish
Parliament may be deemed "more" legitimate by Scots than one enacted by the
Westminster Parliament because it was enacted by a Scottish legislature, it might
49 The Westphalian principle of sovereignty, that external actors are excluded from exercising influence
over domestic authority structures, is breached by numerous voluntary international agreements,
the most sophisticated of which undoubtedly are the EU Treaties.
50 "Britain's Programme Of Constitutional Change."
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equally be deemed to be "less" legitimate if it is believed to be the product of an
inter-governmental cabal convening outside the parliamentary process.51 This
argument can be clarified by considering the difference between the legal or formal
validity of an action, on the one hand, and the social or informal validity of the same
action on the other. As Weiler has argued, conceptions of legitimacy or validity extend
beyond syllogism: we do not judge the legitimacy of an action solely by reference to
its consequences. It is equally valid to apply legitimacy-illegitimacy discourse to the
rule according to which the decision to undertake the action was reached. That is to
say, the legitimacy of an outcome (policy) can be assessed by reference to the
legitimacy of decisional rule which generated it, even where that rule is consistent
with constitutional procedure. Decisional rules are thus being appraised by appeal
to a deeper normative rule which "may pertain to some normative political theory
which sets out conditions for 'legitimate' government... It may also pertain to ethics
and morality as providing a deeper order of legitimacy against which even formally
valid acts of governance may be checked".52 The upshot of this argument is that not
all outcomes necessarily command legitimacy in the broad sense even though they
may be produced by constitutionally valid rules if these rules themselves are deemed
to be illegitimate by reference to some commonly held notion of justice or fairness
or appropriateness. Lord Irvine's comments can be interpreted in precisely this
manner.53 We may apply justifiably this form of legitimacy test to concordats as joint
policy-making procedures and arrangements which deliver tangible outcomes. If
the outcomes are to be accepted as valid, then these procedures and arrangements
have to command legitimacy. Do the rules set out in concordats command legitimacy
in this broad sense? In the light of the marginal role played by either the Scottish
Parliament or the Welsh Assembly in shaping or endorsing the concordats, it is
difficult to argue that they have been subjected to a legitimacy test.54 Given the key
role that the concordats are set to play in stabilising the reformed system of UK
governance, this may have been an important opportunity missed.55
51 Ultimately this will depend on whether the public dislikes unrepresentative government more or
less than collaborative government.
52 J H H Weiler, "Legitimacy and democracy of union governance", in G Edwards and A Pijpers (eds),
The Politics ofEuropean Treaty Reform (1997) at 250 (emphasis added).
53 In a speech to the Constitution Unit in December 1998, Lord Irvine described the situation
confronting the incoming Labour Government as, "something approaching a national crisis of
confidence in the political system".
54 Although the concordats were debated and endorsed in both devolved chambers, neither the Scottish
Parliament or the Welsh Assembly had the authority to amend the terms of documents.
55 For an alternative, but consistent, treatment of legitimacy, see C Meyer, "Exploring the European
Union's communication deficit" (1999) 37(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 617. Meyer
defines legitimacy as "a property of governance consisting] of an empirical component (public
trust and support) and a normative component (justifiableness according to norms, values,
traditions)".
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(2) Concordats and accountability
Our second critique invokes considerations of accountability. Here we focus
specifically on the arrangements agreed between the devolved administrations and
UK Government for mediating policy-related disagreements—i.e. the procedures
of the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). Arguably, the actions of the JMC will
have the greatest constitutional impact over time—both in terms of its specific recom-
mendations, and with respect to the manner in which it functions. As indicated
earlier, the principal role of the JMC is to broker an inter-administration consensus
with respect to policies of joint interest to the devolved and UK Governments where
other channels—including the offices of the territorial Secretaries of State—have
failed.56 The JMC will be "one of the principal mechanisms for consultation on UK
positions on EU issues".57 While the JMC is a consultative body, "the expectation is
that participating administrations will support positions that the JMC has agreed".58
Therefore, although the JMC occupies no constitutional standing its deliberations
are likely to assume considerable political significance. It is already clear that interest
does not focus solely on the consensus position that the JMC might reach, but extends
to the arguments which the participants present as the deliberations proceed.
However, the MoU stipulates that: "The proceedings of the JMC will be regarded as
confidential by the participants, in order to permit free and candid discussion",
although "there may be occasions on which the Committee will wish to issue a public
statement on the outcome of its discussions".59 This stipulation, agreed by both UK
Government and the devolved administrations, raises fundamental questions of
accountability.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines accountable as being "obliged to give a
reckoning or explanation for one's actions: responsible". In orthodox approaches to
government, accountability is regarded as one of three pillars of democratic
government, the others being the authority to govern, which is contingent on the
electoral process, and the responsiveness ofgovernment, which requires government
to meet the needs of all sections of society and not just its own constituents. In turn,
for a government to be accountable for its actions, it must articulate a statement of
aims; its actions in meeting these aims must be transparent; and it must assume
responsibility for outcomes. Should any one of these conditions be breached, then
accountability can only be partial at best. Self-evidently the arrangements for the
JMC breach the transparency of actions requirement, and leave the other two largely
56 We confine our comments to the JMC in dispute settlement. Thus we are ignoring the "ceremonial"
meetings of the JMC, and meetings of the "standing" Committees that have been established—i.e.
on social exclusion and on the information society.
57 MoU, A1.9.
58 Ibid, Al.10.
59 Ibid, Al.11.
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at the discretion of the administrations. While the MoU states that a public statement
may be issued following a JMC, the implication is that this will report the consensus
reached rather than the deliberations involved. In effect, therefore, the JMC
procedures agreed upon will not render the devolved Executive accountable to
the devolved Parliament, or the public at large, for the actions it takes—actions that
may impact directly on the scope for the Parliament to exercise its legislative
authority. The reasons given for the confidential nature of JMC deliberations are
convincing to a point. Clearly where the JMC convenes to agree a matter such as the
UK negotiating position to be represented in prospective EU policy deliberations it
would make no sense to publicise the outcome ahead of the negotiations. Similarly,
certain policy discussions may involve questions appertaining to national defence
and security which, by their nature, must remain confidential. However, obvious
exceptions apart, the case for confidentiality—especially after the relevant negotia-
tions are concluded or policy agreements reached—is less convincing. Transparency
need not require the publication of a verbatim transcript of the deliberations.
Authoritative reports of the discussions, or agreed minutes of the meetings, would
go far in facilitating the accountability of the Executive. However, shrouding the
activities of this key committee in secrecy can do little to advance the legitimacy of
the evolving governance arrangements.
In the critique offered here, we conclude that there were valid grounds for arguing
that the concordats should have been the subject of a comprehensive debate in the
Scottish Parliament, and required the ratification of the Parliament before being
adopted by the Scottish Executive. But is this an issue solely of historical interest?
Or, are there reasons for expecting the matter of concordats to return to the political
agenda? In the next section we consider why the controversy over the concordats
may not yet be over.
D. CONCORDATS AND REGIONALISM: TAKING SUBSIDIARITY
SERIOUSLY?
It is fitting to reflect on UK devolution in the context of the current EU-wide trend
towards greater policy autonomy being given to regions even within its more
centralist member states. Although the structure of regional governance in the
EU falls significantly short of that which proponents of a "Europe of the regions"
might advocate, devolution in the UK none the less is consistent with a general shift
in the direction of an emerging EU system of multi-level governance comprising
supra-national, national, and sub-national (or "third level") elements.60 This raises
60 For a critical and informed review of the role of the "third level" in EU governance, see C Jeffery,
"Sub-national mobilisation and European integration" 2000 38(1) Journal of Common Market
Studies 1.
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the question to what extent is devolution a practical example of the principle of
subsidiarity—a principle that has, since the ratification of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU), informed many contributions to the "Europe of the regions"
literature? What, if any, lessons may the advocates of a greater measure of subsidiarity
in EU governance draw from the process of devolution as it has been applied in the
UK? In this section we argue that the UK's devolution experience in fact demon-
strates the limitation of subsidiarity as a device for transcending the policy and
legitimacy problems inherent to a process of trans-national governance generally,
and EU governance in particular.
The role of the sub-national (or third) level of governance within the evolving
structure of overall EU governance has, in recent years, become something of a
preoccupation on the part of EU scholars. For many, a shift towards an multi-level
governance system for the EU, in which regions play a larger role in the overall
policy process, is considered to be both possible and desirable."1 Enhancing the
authority of the regions not only permits EU economic and social policies to
be better adapted to dissimilar conditions within individual member states, it
also represents a barrier to an over-concentration of power at the highest (EU)
governance level. Instead, a shift to genuine multi-level governance in the EU will
ensure that governance remains, or will be brought, close(r) to the citizens and
societies it serves and thus will retain, or will acquire, popular legitimacy as a result.62
However, much of this discussion of regionalism in EU governance is conducted in
informal language. Multi-level governance is presented as a decision-making
system in which regions within EU member states become involved as independent
participants in the arrangements of EU policy-making and have competence for
common policies which they are best placed to formulate and implement. The
difficulty is—as the experience ofUK devolution shows—that multi-level governance
inevitably will be characterised by a plurality of sovereignties involving multiple
agencies with shared and overlapping constitutional authorities. In the context of
the EU debate, subsidiarity as a "rule of policy assignment" has been advanced as a
device to ensure coherence in an EU multi-level governance system that includes
sub-national authorities. The general subsidiarity "rule" stipulates that the
competence for a policy should be assigned to that level of governance which can
discharge it most efficiently, and that wherever possible this should be at that level
61 For a comprehensive review of this debate, see G Marks, L Hooghe and K Blank, "European
integration from the 1980s" (1996) 34(3) Journal of Common Market Studies 341.
62 Among the objectives listed in a recent strategy document, the Commission includes new forms of
European governance which include "new forms of partnership between different levels of
governance in Europe", and strengthening "civil society's voice in the process of policy shaping and
implementation to ensure a proper representation of Europe's social and economic diversity at
European Union level". European Commission, Shaping the New Europe; Strategic Objectives 2000-
2005, COM (154), February 2000, at 5-7.
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which is "closest" to the citizen. Given that policy overlap and policy contagion are
unavoidable features of multi-level governance, this will yield an EU governance
arrangement in which each of the EU institutions, the member state and the sub-
national governments singly and severally exercise policy competencies.
An important element in the growing preoccupation with multi-level governance
has been the decline in the importance of the sovereign nation state within the EU
decisional architecture. Indeed, some have questioned whether the nation state
remains at all relevant to the current phase in the evolution of the EU. An example
of this type of thinking is to be found in Neil MacCormick's collection of essays,
Questioning Sovereignty 63 There, he demonstrates how membership of the EU has
changed fundamentally the nature of national sovereignty:64
It is clear that absolute or unitary sovereignty is entirely absent from the legal andpolitical setting of the European Community. Neither politically nor legally is any
member state in possession of ultimate power over its own internal affairs. Politically,
the Community affects vital interests, and exercises political power on some matters
over member states. Legally, Community legislation binds member states and
overrides internal state-law within the respective criteria of validity. So the states are
no longer fully sovereign states externally, not can any of their internal organs be
considered to enjoy present internal sovereignty under law; nor have they unimpairedpolitical sovereignty.65
He concludes: "Western Europe's successful transcendence of the sovereign state
and of state sovereignty is greatly to be welcomed."66 Later he suggests that sub-
sidiarity can be a basis for recognising "further levels of system differentiation",67
where this points to arrangements of governance "beneath" the nation state as
well as beyond it. In short, subsidiarity is seen as offering a mechanism for recon-
ciling the demands of sub-national groups for a greater measure of legislative
autonomy in a way that does not undermine the coherent and unitary economic
and political framework of the EU. It provides a non-divisive method for promoting
self-determination and cultural diversity. But is this a correct reading of subsidiarity?
It is certainly true that European integration has changed the nature of national
sovereignty available to the EU member states. Similarly, subsidiarity provides a
conceptual framework for assigning competencies between national and EU levels
of authority. However, we take issue with two propositions implicit or explicit in
the aspirations for EU multi-level governance as suggested by MacCormick. First, is
63 N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth(1999) at 123-136.
64 This argument is worked through in ch 8 ("On sovereignty and post-sovereignty") and ch 9("Democracy and subsidiarity in the European Commonwealth") of the volume.
65 Ibid, 133 (emphasis added).
66 Ibid, 133.
67 Ibid, 135.
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it true to say that European integration has transcended "the sovereign state [and]
state sovereignty"? Second, is subsidiarity capable of providing an intellectual
framework for determining policy assignment beneath the level of the nation-state
as well as beyond that level? The conclusion we derive from our analysis of the
devolved governance arrangements in the UK instead is that subsidiarity, as defined
in the Treaty of European Union (TEU), has a meaning only within the unique
setting of the EU as a union of sovereign states. And, insofar as the EU remains
solely a union comprising of nation states, while subsidiarity may continue to inspire
thinking about the structure ofmulti-level governance in the EU, it cannot be applied
instrumentally to achieving that end.
Elsewhere we have argued, as have others, that the principle of subsidiaritywithin
the EU debate, and as reflected in European Treaty reform, in fact comprises two
elements.68 On the one hand, it is presented as a tenet of democratic government
which stipulates that decisions should be taken as closely to the citizens as possible.69
As MacCormick notes:
The doctrine of subsidiarity requires decision-making to be distributed to the most
appropriate level. In that context, the best democracy—and the best interpretation of
popular sovereignty—is one that insists on levels of democracy appropriate to levels
of decision-making.70
On the other hand, subsidiarity is advanced as a (potentially justiciable) procedural
rule for assigning powers between different levels of government according to
specific efficiency criteria, within the constraints imposed by compliance with
democratic principles.'1 When presented as a doctrine or canon ofgood governance,
the appeal of subsidiarity is self-evident. Further, it is a doctrine that plausibly can
be applied to conceptualise a range of alternative arrangements for the governance
of a system in which public policies exist, and in which decisions about the nature of
these policies have to be taken.
But persuasive as it may be as a doctrine, subsidiarity suffers from two principal
defects as a constitutional tool. In the first place the complexities arising from policy
externalities already described (i.e. overlap and contagion) have to be effectively
managed if a binary rule of policy assignment is to be avoided and, instead,
68 See A Scott, J Peterson and D Millar, "Subsidiarity: A Europe of the Regions vs the British
Constitution?" 32(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 47.
69 This depiction of subsidiarity appeared in art A, TEU (art 1, Treaty of Amsterdam).
70 N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth,
at 135.
71 Article 5 (ex 3b), Treaty of Amsterdam. Under this rule, the EU will act in areas of concurrent
competence "only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States". However, as has been argued, this is a very imprecise rule and
alternative formulations exist which better lend themselves to objective operationalisation.
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subsidiarity applied meaningfully.'2 This is because subsidiarity is a process for
managing competing claims with respect to the application of concurrent powers.
To achieve this, subsidiarity must have a capacity to direct a legislative inquiry in
order to determine the consequences should one level of governance refrain from
exercising its legitimate authority over a measure in deference to considerations
raised by another level of governance with whom it shares competence over that
measure.73 If it is to command legitimacy, such an inquiry must be transparent and
engage the legislatures involved (not the executives). It must evaluate both elements
(legitimacy and efficiency) that comprise the principle of subsidiarity, and the process
should be justiciable.74 Second, the corollary to a consistent application of subsidiarity
is the requirement that the multi-level governance structure is sufficiently fluid to
permit policy competencies to be reassigned between the different levels as circum-
stances dictate. It is unlikely that a particular configuration of policy assignment will
remain optimal indefinitely. As the barriers that separate the internal economy and
society (i.e. the policy jurisdictions) of the EU progressively fall, the interdepen-
dencies between the regions will intensify. The logic of this, as the history of the EU
has demonstrated, is for more and more authority automatically to gravitate to the
"higher" level of governance.'5 This can be avoided only by correctly specifying
the conditions necessary to facilitate that application of subsidiarity as a process
—that is, as an on-going and ever-present legislative inquiry. If we are to define a
constitutional architecture for EU governance, first we have to stipulate the
objectives that we wish it to meet, and the criteria by which we might appraise or
revise it. This is not a novel argument. Any account of the origins of the prevailing
constitutional arrangements of EU governance would focus on the primary objective
of designing a governance system that revolved around (and buttressed) the nation
state but which, at the same time, eroded or contained particular elements of national
sovereignty through a partial shift to supranational governance.76 Further, a
prominent role would be accorded to the judicial process within that arrangement.
In a similar way, only a comprehensive analysis of the role that subsidiarity can play
72 A binary rule simply states that if one level of governance has competence over the policy, no other
level of governance has authority over how that competence is exercised. While a binary rule is
possible, it raises serious problems of policy spillover and policy contagion unless a strict separation
of the policy jurisdictions can be enforced.
73 The suggestion of a legislative inquiry originates in G A Bermann, "Taking subsidiarity seriously:
federalism in the European Community and the United States" (1994) 94 (2) Columbia Law Review
335.
74 Legitimacy requires accountability, which in turn necessitates transparency. Bermann describes this
as the "confidence building" function of subsidiarity: ibid at 367.
75 In effect this describes the historical dynamic of "state-building"—see S H Beer, To Make a Nation:
The Rediscovery ofAmerian Federalism (1993) at 11.
76 See, for instance, A S Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (1992).
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in legitimating the EU governance system will enable us to design the constitutional
arrangements necessary for its realisation."
To be sure, the governance system of the EU has, partially and imperfectly,
accommodated both defects noted above. The formulation of subsidiarity set out in
art 5 (ex 3b) of the TEU was an attempt to manage the problem of concurrent
powers by setting an effectiveness "test" that all proposed EU policy actions must
meet before they could become EU legislative proposals, and authority could
consequentially gravitate to the EU level. But that test has neither been conducted
transparently, nor been subject to judicial review.'8 Subsidiarity as practiced in the
EU therefore fails the test of a meaningful legislative inquiry and, consequently, is
unlikely to enhance confidence within the polity. Similarly, the EU governance
system has proven itself to be fluid within its constitutional limitations. Competencies
have been transferred from national to the EU governance level, both by formal
Treaty revisions, and informally by use of the provisions of art 308 (ex 235).79 In
most, if not all, cases this transfer of competence has been predicated on efficiency
considerations. Frequently, the competencies newly assigned to the EU level touched
on policies hitherto the responsibility of sub-national governments ofmember states,
and it is those governments who have been the integration "losers".s" Therefore,
while the extension of EU competencies may be regarded as extending the scope of
supranational governance in the aggregate policy process at the expense of national
governance, at the same time it has served to empower national governments at the
expense of sub-national governments. This tendency for integration simultaneously
to extend the competencies of EU governance and to strengthen the national
institutions of member state governments is a well-known feature of the integration
process.
Despite its partial and imperfect application thus far, the principle ofsubsidiarity
as a process mediating policy assignment between the EU and the member state
remains conceptually and constitutionally plausible. But this is the extent of its
plausibility. When we turn to national and sub-national systems of governance,
however, subsidiarity is not plausible. As implicit in MacCormick's arguments, the
77 Multi-level governance differs from multi-level administration, a difference which is not adequately
addressed in the "regionalist" literature. Governance involves participation in each of the four stages
of policy-making (formulation, negotiation, implementation, enforcement); administration in only
the latter two of these.
78 The justiciability of subsidiarity is a subject of considerable debate within EU legal discourse. See
the discussion in G de Búrca, "Reappraising subsidiarity's significance after Amsterdam", Jean
Monnet Working Papers No 7/99, Harvard Law School.
79 In revisions to the Treaty of Rome there has been only one instance where a binary rule was applied:
this was competence over monetary policy post-EMU. For obvious reasons competence for EU
monetary policy could not be a shared between EU and national organs.
80 This explains why the TEU provided for the creation of the Committee of the Regions and introduced
art 203 (ex 146).
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matter turns on competing interpretations of sovereignty and, in particular, on his
claim that "the [member] states are no longer fully sovereign states externally".
Krasner lists four usages of the term sovereignty:81 domestic sovereignty, which is
the organisation of authority within the nation state; interdependence sovereignty,
which refers to a state's ability effectively to control external problems independently
of other states; international legal sovereignty, defined as a residing with a state
whose claim to territoriality is recognised by other states and which voluntarily may
enter into, or leave, agreements with other states; and Westphalian sovereignty,
describing the non-interference by external actors in domestic authority arrange-
ments. The key point is that while EU membership has eroded significantly both
interdependence sovereignty and (consequently) Westphalian sovereignty, and has
thereby restricted the scope of domestic sovereignty (although formally only in
the sphere of laws),82 it is not clear that it has undermined the international legal
sovereignty of the member states. The litmus test of international legal sovereignty
is whether or not a member state has the competence to withdraw from the EU. If it
can do so, international legal sovereignty must be intact; if it cannot, then it has
surrendered that sovereignty.83
It is tempting to regard this question solely as a matter of EU or international law
which is possibly hypothetical.84 But the implications extend beyond this legal
technicality and impact directly on the application of subsidiarity in the manner
proposed by advocates of multi-level governance. This is because it is only when
a level of governance has international legal sovereignty that it is equipped to
participate directly in a trans-national legislative inquiry concerning the management
of concurrent powers.85 And because levels of member state governance other than
the national level are not sovereign in that sense, and accordingly have no
independent constitutional status in the EU Treaties, they are unable to participate
as partners in a process ofpolicy assignment involving such an inquiry. Sub-national
governments have no competence under EU law independently to participate in, or
to conclude, agreements at the EU level. They may only do so in the restrictive
sense of being delegates of the member state, as under art 203 (ex 146). Were they
to have such independent competence, the international legal sovereignty ofmember
81 S D Krasner, Sovereignty; Organized Hypocrisy (1999) at 9-25.
82 Krasner's definition of domestic sovereignty refers to "authority" to act and not "autonomy" to act.
Only in the legal sphere does EU membership impinge on domestic "authority" structures.
83 The comparison is usually made with the US Constitution and the nationalist versus compact theorist
debate which surrounded that Union in the run-up to the Civil War. The triumph of the nationalist
rather than compact interpretation led to the conclusion that a state could not legally withdraw from
the Union. In the EU any similar suggestion almost certainly would be considered preposterous.
84 As is well known, the problem stems from the silence of the EU Treaties on the issue of secession.
85 Although most federal systems have constitutional rules governing policy assignment between levels
of government within the nation state, and means of changing this assignment, clearly these rules
are not transferable to trans-national governance structures such as the EU.
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states would, by definition, have ended. The conclusion is clear. Subsidiarity in the
sense applied in EU discussions and in the TEU provides little effective purchase in
effecting directly a transition to a genuine system of multi-level governance in the
EU. It does, however, indicate the constitutional conditions required for such a
transition to begin—namely that regions acquire a position of constitutional authority
within the arrangements of EU governance allowing them to become a participant
in a policy assignment process mediated by the principle of subsidiarity. Our review
of subsidiarity indicates that the EU system of governance not only buttresses the
role of the nation state rather than jeopardising it, but at the same time creates an
incentive structure for sub-national government to campaign for independent
statehood within the EU. This is the only route currently available for sub-national
governments to participate in the subsidiarity process and, consequently, to react to
demands for a greater measure of self-government and local autonomy as citizens
increasingly question the legitimacy of a governance system in which regions have
no constitutional "voice".
These questions of governance, legitimacy and subsidiarity are not confined to
the EU but have broader relevance as reflected in research being conducted by
international relations theorists and international legal scholars.86 A pervasive feature
of the organisation of the contemporary global economy is the emergence of inter-
national institutions which incorporate binding and enforceable rules and which are
replacing the organisations of (commercial) diplomacy hitherto based on voluntary
codes, behavioral norms, and policy discretion.8' Although there is considerable
dispute in the literature over the nature of the autonomy which these new institutions
command—autonomy as delegated power versus autonomy as independent
authority—few take issue as to the nature of the transformation underway. This
poses a clear and distinctive set of challenges for national governance systems
everywhere, challenges that are foreshadowed in the subsidiarity debate in the EU.
Similar questions are bound to arise as the competence ofglobal governance extends
into new areas; that is, as policy spillover proceeds.88 What powers will sub-national
86 For an excellent review of this literature see A-M Slaughter, A S Tulumello and S Wood,
"International law and international relations: a new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship"
(1998) 92(3) American Journal of International Law 367. However, the genesis of this work is much
older. It is foreshadowed by J H H Weiler in his 1982 exhortation that political scientists take more
account of the role of the European Court of Justice in analysing the political dynamics of European
integration (J H H Weiler, "Community member states and European integration" (1982) 21 (1 & 2)
Journal ofCommon Market Studies 39. For the seminal analysis of the interaction between the EU
legal order and the integration process generally, see J H H Weiler, "The transformation of Europe"(1991) Yale Law Journal 100.
87 Slaughter et al note that "much [international] institutionalised co-operation has taken an increasingly
'legalized',' judicialized' or constitutional form", ibid at 370.
88 For example, spillover is evident by the emergence of international debates over common rules with
respect to a raft of trade-related national measures including competition policy, environmental
issues and labour standards.
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authorities be able to retain as global governance moves into new policy areas and
nation states are required to acquire greater authority over domestic policies in
order that they may successfully bargain within these international governance
institutions? To turn the argument around, in a world where an ever-increasing part
of our economic and social interactions is governed by international institutions
according to rules, regulations and conventions, what scope remains for meaningful
regionalism that does not undermine the international legal sovereignty of the
state?
E. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have reviewed the role of the concordats in the new, post-devolution
governance of the UK. The object of the paper has been to demonstrate the
procedural centrality and constitutional significance of the concordats to the revised
governance system, despite the fact that concordats have no constitutional status.
None the less much will depend on the practical inter-administration policy-making
arrangements and dispute resolution provisions that are set out in the concordats. It
is these arrangements that have to manage the transition from a singular to a pluralist
governance system for the UK, and make a success of the latter. To the extent that
devolution was a response to the crisis of legitimacy of UK Government, we suggest
that the failure to have these documents fully debated and subject to ratification by
the new territorial assemblies was ill-judged. Because the concordats were adopted
by the administrations without first referring these to public scrutiny and debate, it
is plausible to claim not only that they have not been properly legitimised but that
policy measures flowing from these arrangements—in devolved or reserved
matters—also are lacking in legitimacy. Were such claims to be made, such is the
centrality of the concordats to UK governance that a similar accusation could be
levelled against the entire model of devolution.
We have also considered the concordats against the background of EU
governance, and, in particular, calls that a greater measure of subsidiarity should
be observed within those arrangements. From this study, it is difficult to contend
that devolution represents a move to greater subsidiarity within either UK or EU
governance, regardless of the temptation to describe devolution in the language of
subsidiarity and multi-level governance systems. Instead, devolution demonstrates
the fundamental weakness inherent to an application of subsidiarity as a general rule
of policy assignment. We argue instead that subsidiarity, as commonly understood,
cannot be used as a device to assign competencies between the different levels in a
multi-level governance system which transcends the nation state, unless each of the
levels have an accepted claim to international legal sovereignty. This condition applies
to none of the sub-national authorities within any of the EU member states.
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None of this changes the nature of the legitimacy crisis affecting either the UK or
EU systems of governance. In the UK system, we have suggested reasons why
devolution may not rescue governance from "something approaching a national crisis
of confidence in the political system". The danger is that the lack of transparency
and accountability which characterised the entire concordat process may undermine
those who would wish to present concordats as necessary and legitimate arrange-
ments for maintaining the coherence of governance in the post-devolution UK. It is
tempting to regard this as an issue ofpurely historic interest. As the concordats were
debated in, and effectively endorsed by, both the Scottish Parliament and the
National Assembly for Wales, our concerns may be deemed to a historical curiosity.
However, under the terms of the concordats it is open to any signatory to request a
review of their provisions. This may or may not occur, and much is likely to depend
on future political developments in Scotland and Wales. As we have seen, the
concordats play a pivotal role in the new constitutional arrangements of the UK.
And because of this, any move to reopen the debate over their content could readily
evolve into a more fundamental constitutional debate the outcome of which is far
from certain.
